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The terms “social inclusion” and “social
exclusion” are now used in many service
settings, policy debates and research
fields. Yet, it seems that different speakers
may be endowing these terms with quite
different, sometimes even distinctly
contested, meanings. The following
attempts to offer a degree of speech
therapy to these different uses and
proceeds in two sections. Firstly, using
a broad brush, the major emphasis is to
identify three varieties of usage: 
• ‘the neo-liberal’; 
• those concerned with ‘the health
of communities and the well-
being of individuals’; and
• those associated with ‘the
critical tradition’.
Two concluding reflections are then raised.
The first argues that attempts to ‘intervene’
with those who are excluded can lead to
the unwanted consequence of reinforcing
stigma and disadvantage and, secondly,
at a different level of analysis, that it is
important that we do not assume that




It is generally accepted that there are
marginalised, that is, excluded – social
groups. However, controversy arises as
to who makes up these groups, the
degree of marginalisation or exclusion,
its various causes and perhaps most
importantly, the appropriate response. 
So, what do the different speakers mean
when they use the phrase “social inclusion
/ exclusion?” Perhaps the most relevant
starting point is the Federal government’s
policy of Mutual Obligation. At the centre
of this policy is the view that the head,
heart and lungs of a society is its economy.
It follows then that those who are employed
have a doubly positive role. As insiders,
they have a righteous self respect as they
not only look after themselves, they also
know that they are the dynamic compo-
nents of an engine that generates the
common good. So, what of those who
are not in the paid workforce? At the very
least, people who are unemployed do
themselves and society as a whole no good
as being unemployed means one is outside
of the productive whole. More likely, in
being unproductively inactive, one is
behaving as a self-scuttling dependent,
a position that authors embarrassment,
even shame, as one is aware of being a
drain on society.
A certain form of activism flows from this
view of the relative value of those on the
“inside” and those on the “outside”, one
that sees “social inclusion” and “social
exclusion” as a frame for analysing welfare
dependence. This framework says that
social policy should never reinforce poor
behaviour and should seek to recruit the
unemployed into the free market as finan-
cially independent actors. This thinking
is at the centre of the Mutual Obligation
policy and sees the “social inclusion/
exclusion” frame as a demand to introduce
procedures to ‘encourage’ those from
the employment periphery into the market
centre where they will be stimulated to
perform affirming rather than self-defeating
roles. 
According to the proponents of Mutual
Obligation the task is to identify oppor-
tunities for ‘behavioural’ adjustment –
the compulsory inclusion – of those who
have been self-defeating into the economic
mainstream. In so far as this step can be
accomplished, the financial burden on
the state will be lowered from the current
level where approximately 20% of the
population is (directly or indirectly)
dependent on benefits. If a significant
proportion of these unproductive persons
can be prodded into participation within
the labour market, this is a clear win.
Intervention, even intensive assistance,
is sensible so that muscular, non-collusive
responses actively target those with
deficits to their market readiness.
In summary, the neo-liberal use of social
exclusion takes this frame in a particular,
purportedly apolitical, direction (Hariss,
2002). Stripped of a declared ideological
badge, this appropriation can be used to
provide a rationale for the blaming of indi-
viduals and their groups as “(p)overty
and social exclusion is mainly interpreted
as being the result of individual deficits”
(McClelland; 2002; 2). Thus, if the focus
becomes the supposedly problematic
characteristics of ‘this group’ – the indige-
nous; the poor; the homeless etc – this
re-purposing recycles the old conserva-
tive interest in social order with a ‘it is for
their own good’ rationale where the
intention to control, hurt or punish is
plausibly denied. Rather, it is simply
‘sensible’ to vigorously target the bad
habits (‘behaviours’) of those who are
out of step as this promotes self mobil-
isation reduces budgetary liabilities. That
additional powers of surveillance and
policing might be introduced, that benefits
may be suspended as part of the behav-
ioural intervention, that this approach
may be tough, is not contested as it is






An interest in ‘the health of communities
and the well-being of individuals’ can be
directly connected with the social inclusion
and exclusion frame and this interest has
been examined in a number of ways, for
example in terms of ‘attachment’ (Maris,
1998). For the current purpose two
(arguably) adjacent developments will be
reviewed. The first of these is social
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Who is ‘In’ and Who is ‘Other’:
A Broad Introduction to Inclusion and Exclusion
capital, a construct most identified with
the North American researcher Robert
Putnam, that has assumed a prominent
profile over the last decade. Whilst there
remain definitional and programmatic
uncertainties with the concept, the gist
of it concerns a focus on public trust and
civil – that is non-governmental and non-
instrumental – participation between
citizens. Putman (2000) argues that both
public trust and civil participation are in
decline and it is this contention that, in
part, potentially aligns the idea of social
capital with the current concern with
exclusion. Although the subject of vigorous
critique (Mowbray, 2004), Putnam’s notions
of promoting citizen activities around
‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ capital, and his
interest in programs for ‘community
capacity building’ and ‘enhanced partic-
ipation’, could be particularly relevant to
those who are seen as marginalised. 
An allied development to that of social
capital is the current interest in, and the
empirical measurement of, (more) rela-
tional and holistic understandings of health
and with the longer term causes of
pathology and disease. Rather than
beginning with the traditional starting
point that ‘health is the absence of disease’,
a number of research groups – such as
The Harvard Centre for Public Health –
have undertaken studies that suggest
health outcomes are statistically condi-
tional on social factors, such as the
variables around a person’s intimate
networks (Kawachi & Berkman, 2003). This
type of finding is associated with the
development of more psycho-social
measures of ‘well-being’ and ‘quality of
life’, indices that seek to clarify risk and
protective factors that are associated
with the non-contraction of, and/or being
able to recover from, physical and psychi-
atric ills. This kind of analysis clearly has
consequences for how an individual’s
longer-term health status is understood
and offers scope for thinking about
exclusion in terms far more complex than
the simply economic. 
In these studies psychosocial health and
well being is seen to be differentially
distributed according to the presence of
these protective and risk factors that
themselves are differentially allocated in
even ‘anglo’ environments. Who does
not do well in terms of health? It is no
surprise that the excluded do poorly,
especially those that are stigmatised.
That health outcomes for indigenous
people are recognised as appalling is
one fact, yet it seems likely that all ‘outcast’
groups do less well than those who are
of the mainstream. For example, the work
of McDonald (1999) on marginalised,
socially dislocated youth in ‘post-indus-
trial’ suburbs paints a discouraging picture
of psycho -social prospects which, more
speculatively, gives no cause for optimism
about longer term morbidity. In terms of
mental illness the National Mental Health
Strategy discussion paper on The
Interactions of Social Capital with Health
and Mental Health canvases the difficul-




Commentators on structural change agree
that globalised, new-economy environ-
ments challenge expectations of equity
and inclusiveness. Within these increas-
ingly competitive settings some groups
experience greater risk of marginalisation,
a vulnerability that is associated with
factors such as educational level,
geographic location and culture as well
as with disability and stigma. With varying
accents, for ‘third way’ policy makers
such patterns are a trigger for interven-
tions, particularly those concerned with
education, that seek to improve partici-
pation and social mobility. In France, and
less radically, in the United Kingdom, this
















as a bridge that links ‘modern’, progres-
sive thinking with an older, left-wing
tradition. For example, terms like ‘anomie’
and ‘alienation’ are familiar to many, even
if they may now seem somehow dated
and without theoretical moorings. Yet, it
can be argued that a thoroughgoing
interest in patterns of ‘social inclusion’ and
‘social exclusion’ denotes a similar,
prepared-to-be-questioning attitude to
social arrangements that was itself the
soil from which these older terms grew. 
In the early work on social exclusion in
France it appears that the commitment
was to focus upon, and critically theorise,
the practices supporting institutional and
structural inequity whether these practices
were based on racial, educational , discur-
sive or other variables. These practices
were understood to continually, yet in a
dynamic manner, construct dividing lines
within ‘first world’ societies. Thus, the
concern was upon explicating the partic-
u lar  forms of ,  and processes for,
constructing and maintaining differential
privilege in democratic, and supposedly
equal, industrial societies. 
An example of this critical impulse is
offered in Bourdieu’s research on the role
the French educational system played in
mal-distributing social goods and repro-
ducing inequality. In this project Bourdieu
(1986) was the first to introduce the
concept of ‘cultural capital’, a construct
he characterised as concerned with the
individual’s capacity to perform the ‘right’
language skills, have the right taste,
display the correct manners, exude a
particular confidence and authority, and
so forth, which he argued is crucial to social
performance. He contended that inherited
money, educational level, current income
and social connections are important, as
are the presence, or relative absence, of
determinants such as legal discrimination
on the basis of disability, race or gender,
for understanding patterns of inclusion
and exclusion. That noted, Bourdieu
argued that these factors were insufficient
in themselves to explain the persistence
of inequality. 
Why?: he argued that explanations for the
perseverance of, and evolutions to,
patterns of inequalities in outcome require
supple and multi-centred enquiry. For
those writers interested in understanding
the processes that embed privilege and
maintain iniquitous probabilities of outcome
– why most people who are indigenous
‘perform’ less well economically; why
health outcomes are mal-distributed
across groups – it is rarely so simple as
to say ‘they are not allowed in, they are
locked out’ as late capitalism, second
modernity – call it what one will – is more
de-centred in its regimes of privilege and
exclusion. Yes, all citizens are equal before
the law, at least nominally, each has an
equal vote, cannot be explicitly discrim-
inated against, and so forth. Yet, how I
talk, what particular attitudes I perform,
how I dress, how I think of, and socially
project myself, my entitlements and
prospects – what Rose and other
Foucauldians call the ‘specifications of
the self’ – are proposed to influence the
odds, if not determine the outcome, in
any single encounter or, in longer terms,
the trajectory of a life course. It is argued
that the maintenance of patterns of
inclusion and exclusion in ‘free and fair’
democracies are now mostly not gated
by way of fixed entry points and locked
passageways. A case in point might be
the example that an Afro-American woman
is now the Secretary of State in the U.S.A.
(even if her boss is the second male in a
dynastic family to be President in less than
a generation.) 
Given the broad, albeit incomplete,
advances in anti-discrimination law and
the formal de-regulation of privilege, in
many respects it is more ‘social identity’
than categorical discrimination that tends
to weight probabilities with respect to
personal prospects. Whether, ‘prospects’
are indexed to health, employment,
income, place of residence, ethnicity or
education, outcomes do not conform to
a normal distribution. If, for example, I come
from the wrong side of the tracks, I am
more likely to be perceived as surly and
bad mannered; if my old man’s trade was
one that has been dislocated by ‘struc-
tural change’, there is a greater chance
I will be on and off benefits; if I am from
one of the negatively stereotyped ethnic
groups – like the “Lebos’ – it is harder to
be given a start. 
And, more specifically as it relates to the
life course, if someone has got off the
educational-developmental train and has
been, for example, living as a junkie or a
crim, that person’s looks and manner,
their otherness, will often be experienced
as ‘a negative’: mainstream people – the
‘straights’ – will feel this person brings
them down. In these ways the software
of destiny is the uneven distribution of
cultural capital. Following the work of
post-colonial and anti-racist theorists,
such as Paul Gilroy, and the advocacy of
politics of identity activists who have
disrupted the inferior, received subject
positions and social locations tradition-
ally accorded to some groups – such as
people who are gay or physically disabled
– we are left with a clear protocol: who
you are, and how your type are seen and
valued, tends to stack the deck with
respect to your prospects. Not that the
battles around gender and sexuality,
disability and race, have been won. Rather,
the rules of the discrimination game
changes as it is played. Who gets ‘other-
ed’ may change but the cap will always
be put on someone’s head. 
So, what of the particular position of the
most vulnerable, those people who may
be seen as in one, or several, of the cate-
gories of ‘at-riskness’ – such as people
who are indigenous, mentally ill, homeless
and unemployed? To have a strong appli-
cation for an insiders place individuals have
to have the right specifications for, have
to conform to, that which is now required
to get and keep a current ticket. To return
directly to the use of the terms social
inclusion and social exclusion, if the above
discussion of the critical tradition has
significant practical and ideological traction
for a speaker, if this tradition illuminates
key landmarks in their view of marginal-
isation and privilege, then it is likely that
this person uses these terms in ways
that connote the importance of social
relations that is characteristic of a critical
politics. 
The Paradox of Pushing
‘Others’ In
Particular programs have been intro-
duced to promote inclusiveness for the
some of the more at-risk populations.
For example, mentoring programs for
people who are disenfranchised – such
as refugee groups – have been estab-
lished. Prompted by the links between
well-being and social capital, health
advocacy bodies have sought to promote
relationships for identified at-risk groups.
In this way an interest in ‘social inclusion’
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has been taken up. However, it is important
to note that people who are homeless or
mentally ill, people who have been other-
ed and caste down, are just like the rest
of us: these people can be – like teenagers
or the wealthy, indeed like every person
from every group – tribal and apparently
snobbish. And, to expect otherwise is to
farm the wrong acres. 
People who have been homeless, or
people who have belonged to any
excluded sub-group for any length of
time, will not be immediately, or perhaps
even eventually, welcoming of represen-
tatives of the mainstream especially if
their ‘invitation to participate’ is the result
of compulsion or sanction. We all live in
our sub-groups and tend to run with, to
be in step with, our own particular pack.
To expect these people to be enthusiastic
‘subjects’ is to take away that which
makes each of us human, our selectivity
in our identity and allegiances, our pride
in our difference.
To be deemed ‘at risk’, to be ‘eligible’,
is to say that this person has a status which
is, at best, marginal or, more likely, is to
assert that their personhood is culpable
and their morality transgressive. If this is
the experience this sets up a definitional
process and a sequence of subsequent
interactions in which what is assumed to
be ‘insight’ – for the subject of interven-
tion to agree with the policy-maker / prac-
titioner that ‘yes, I am the problem’ –
offers the subject a choice between
‘subservience’ or ‘resistance.’ The identity
of those who have been ‘other-ed’, that
is generally stigmatised, has to be at
issue for this reason and practitioner and
subject can then easily become locked
into an existential battle on the identity
of subject to be “treated”. 
It is for this reason that ‘we’ – as deliv-
erers of programs, as policy makers, as
students and teachers – need to be reflec-
tive and respectful. By trying to push
people in, we can reinforce or even exac-
erbate that which we seek to reduce.
Perhaps, the key task is to respect the
subjectivities of the sub-group and the
power of group processes (Mullaly, 2002).
While our aim may be to ‘normalise’ those
who have been other-ed, this needs to
be done in a way that is neither prescrip-
tive nor corrective; that is, to offer expe-
riences within which ‘their’ difference is
accentuated and accepted, is legitimated
even celebrated, and where this repre-
sents choice and not co-option.
And who is to say being an “insider” is
necessarily following the better path?
Some jobs are stigmatising, even exploita-
tive, so that participation can result in
lowered self-respect rather than in self -
fulfillment just as some relationships can
be unhealthy. Likewise is it not possible
that some high status, ‘insider’ positions,
roles that are exclusively concerned with
the bottom-line for example, might ferment
individual psychopathy and social divi-
siveness? Similarly, there are dangers in
being an intensely leveraged earner and
consumer. Indeed, it ‘pays’ to be less than
completely obedient: just as it is illogical
to equate one hours paid work a week
with gainful employment, it remains the
c a s e  t h a t  h o w e v e r  t h e  s o c i a l
inclusion/social exclusion frame might
be employed, this frame itself is not
beyond criticism, for example in setting
the terms for debate in an ‘either’ – ‘or’
fashion. Many of us would be unhappy
about the assumption that being ‘in’ is
necessarily the one and only place to be. 
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